The recent global outspread of the COVID-19 pandemic has influenced the lives of people across multiple countries including athletes, coaches, and supporting staff. Along with everybody else, coaches found themselves constrained to an at-home self-isolation, which limited their ability to normally engage with their profession and to interact with their athletes. This situation may also have impacted their own psychological well-being. With this study, we explored coaches’ perceptions of stress in relation to their emotion regulation strategies depending upon their gender (...) and competitive level. A sample of 2272 Italian coaches were surveyed during the period of lockdown. Mean values for perceived stress and emotion regulation strategies were compared to normative data of the two instruments as reported in the original studies. Furthermore, two Multivariate analyses of variance were completed to observe the potential differences in the coaches’ emotion regulation strategies and perception of stress. Finally, a blockwise regression analysis was run to assess how coaches’ emotion regulation strategies impacted upon their perception of stress. Both women and men reported higher levels of perceived stress than those reported in the normative data. Similarly, average scores for emotion regulation strategies were significantly different from those reported for normative data, in particular, coaches reported slightly higher use of emotion regulation strategies than participants in the original study. Significant gender-based differences emerged in terms of emotional regulations, with men adopting more suppression than women. No differences by competitive level were found. In terms of perceived stress, male coaches and elite coaches showed to be more in control of the situation than female coaches and non-elite coaches, respectively, while women experienced more negative stress than men. The blockwise regression evidenced how reappraisal resulted to be predictive in helping coaches to reduce their perception of stress, while suppression predicted higher stress perceptions. (shrink)

Despite that it is commonly accepted that migraine is a disorder of the nervous system with a prominent genetic basis, it is comorbid with a plethora of medical conditions. Several studies have found bidirectional comorbidity between migraine and different disorders including neurological, psychiatric, cardio- and cerebrovascular, gastrointestinal, metaboloendocrine, and immunological conditions. Each of these has its own genetic load and shares some common characteristics with migraine. The bidirectional mechanisms that are likely to underlie this extensive comorbidity between migraine and other (...) diseases are manifold. Comorbid pathologies can induce and promote thalamocortical network dysexcitability, multi-organ transient or persistent pro-inflammatory state, and disproportionate energetic needs in a variable combination, which in turn may be causative mechanisms of the activation of an ample defensive system with includes the trigeminovascular system in conjunction with the neuroendocrine hypothalamic system. This strategy is designed to maintain brain homeostasis by regulating homeostatic needs, such as normal subcortico-cortical excitability, energy balance, osmoregulation, and emotional response. In this light, the treatment of migraine should always involves a multidisciplinary approach, aimed at identifying and, if necessary, eliminating possible risk and comorbidity factors. (shrink)

The article is the consequence of some critical notes to the contribution of Paolo Bellan, arising from reading of essays of Francesco Emmolo and Carlo Sini and the assumption of a purely phenomenological perspective in the interpretation of the processes of acquisition of scientific knowledge.

The Sienese tradition of technical design is perhaps most emblematically represented in the treatises of Francesco di Giorgio Martini, illustrated compendia that were widely popular and frequently reproduced in the early modern period. The number of manuscripts featuring drawings associated with Francesco di Giorgio numbers in the hundreds. But in underscoring Francesco’s connection with this rich body of material, scholars have often overlooked the inherent value of the manuscripts as copy volumes: technical design manuals that (...) guided practitioners in a course of autodidactic education. What is more, by insisting that such manuscripts are part of Francesco’s legacy, scholars have never fully considered the alternative: what if this distinctive corpus of designs did not directly derive from Francesco di Giorgio? At stake here is not only a revisionist history of the celebrated Sienese architect, but also an enriched understanding of early modern architectural training. Two anonymous manuscript model books—London, British Library Add. MS 34113 and Dresden, Sächsische Landes bibliothek MS Ob. 13—provide the basis for a critical enquiry into this very question. Careful study of the manuscripts’ contents, both graphic and textual, reveals an extraordinary number of parallels: between the volumes themselves, and with the ‘signature’ compilations of Francesco di Giorgio. The disclosed material does not recast Francesco as a mere copyist. Rather, it shows him as an engaged member of a vibrant artistic community: one in which information of all kinds was openly exchanged, and copying was the established means by which designers trained and assembled a repertoire of practical models. (shrink)

In this article we explore the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious as it has taken shape within contemporary cognitive science - meaning by this term the mature cognitive science, which has fully incorporated the results of the neurosciences. In this framework we first compare the neurocognitive unconscious with the Freudian one, emphasizing the similarities and above all the differences between the two constructs. We then turn our attention to the implications of the centrality of unconscious processes in cognitive science (...) for the classical conception of the self. Our analysis will bring to light a bit of claustrophobic dialectic between an eliminative variety of naturalism and an anti-naturalistic form of hermeneutics. Hence we conclude by recommending the pursuit of a mediation between such extreme stances. (shrink)

Introduzione Il modello della mente estesa (mme) afferma che esistono processi cognitivi distribuiti nell’ambiente e veicolati da strumenti esterni di elaborazione dell’informazione. In questo scritto metto in rilievo una serie di difficoltà che affliggono mme in relazione alla nozione di soggetto degli stati mentali — ovvero alla questione di chi sia il titolare degli stati e dei processi cognitivi che si estenderebbero nell’ambiente. La tesi che viene sostenuta è che, sebbene sia possibile...

In this book we offer a theory of the self, whose core ideas are that the self is a process of self-representing, and this process aims mainly at defending the self-conscious subject against the threat of its metaphysical inconsistence. In other words, the self is essentially a repertoire of psychological manoeuvres whose outcome is a self-representation aimed at coping with the fundamental fragility of the human subject. Our picture of the self differs from both the idealist and the eliminative approaches (...) widely represented in contemporary discussion. Against the idealist approach, we deny that the self is something primitive and logically prior. Rather, we take it to be the result of a process of construction that starts with subpersonal unconscious processes. On the other hand, we also reject the anti-realistic, eliminative argument that, from the non-primary, derivative nature of the self, infers its status as an illusory by-product of real neurobiological events, devoid of any explanatory role. (shrink)

This commentary focuses on three aspects of Sandro Nannini’s paper Time and Consciusness in Cognitive Naturalism: the parallel between Einstein’s theory of relativity and the new science of the mind/brain; the Cartesian characterization of non-reductionist positions in the philosophy of mind; the alleged illusory status of consciousness, free will and the Self. We suggest, first, that Nannini overstates the success of cognitive neuroscience; second, that non-reductionism is not necessarily a Cartesian position; and third, that the neurocognitive science data do not (...) show or even suggest, that consciousness, free will and the Self are illusory phenomena. (shrink)

Tim Crane's ‘Cosmic Hermeneutics vs. Emergence: The Challenge of the Explanatory Gap’ claims that non‐reductive physicalism must either close the explanatory gap, addressing the challenge famously posed by Levine's argument, or become identical to emergentism. Since no way to close the gap is available, the result is that there can be no interesting philosophical position intermediate between physicalism and emergentism. This chapter argues that if we look at the relation between physicalism and emergentism from the vantage point of reduction, Crane's (...) analysis is rather persuasive. However, if we switch from reduction to causality, its conclusions appear more disputable. In particular, if we shift from ‘novelty and explanation’ to ‘novelty and causality’ as key features of emergent properties, we may introduce a distinction between two kinds of emergentism (moderate and radical) based on their attitude towards the causal inheritance principle. If the causal inheritance principle is accepted (some versions of) moderate emergentism may be considered as non‐trivial forms of non‐reductive physicalism. (shrink)

Recent development of cognitive neuroscience shows the increasing capacity to propose neurobiological accounts of social cognition. Much research in fields such as neuroeconomics, neuroethics and neuroesthetics offers “brain-based” explanations of behaviour. But what is a “brain-based” explanation? And what is its relation with higher-level explanations? We may call “neurobiological fundamentalism” the thesis that the neural level is epistemologically fundamental – and that the higher-level explanations supplied by the special sciences such as psychology, are derivative. In this context, the main aim (...) of the present paper is to criticize neurobiological fundamentalism and to offer an alternative account based on explicative pluralism, a perspective that emphasizes the plurality of concepts, methods and evidential resources that characterise contemporary science of the mind. (shrink)

In this paper we offer some ideas on the relationship between metaphysics of causation and common explanatory practices of behaviour. We first suggest a sort of “negotiating model” for theorizing about mental causation, and then examine the so-called causal closure argument focusing on some morals one can draw from it that further illustrate the model we recommend.

Some philosophers and cognitive scientists think that a naturalised philosophy of the (self-) conscious mind should lead us to reject the very existence of the self. The paper focuses on two case-studies which are representative of this kind of attitude. In particular we examine, and criticise, Thomas Metzinger's 'no-self alternative' and Daniel Dennett's narrative elimination of the self. Our aim is not to prove that any elimination of the self from the inventory of the world based on the empirical study (...) of the mind is doomed to failure. Instead, we would like to introduce a note of caution: it is far from clear that cognitive science and naturalistic philosophies of mind force upon us, or even suggest, a picture of the world without persons and selves. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the role and value of thought experiments concerning phenomenal consciousness. It is divided in two parts. The first part surveys the philosophical and scientific context in which many well-known thought experiments concerning the mind and consciousness have their roots. In particular it focuses on the problems left open by scientific theories about consciousness and by many attempts to reduce the mind to the physical world. The second part is a case study: it concentrates on the analysis (...) of the zombie thought experiment aiming to show how a simple and rather naive image, the zombie intuition, has originated stimulating and complex arguments, enriching our philosophical and intellectual landscape. On the whole, the paper highlights the fact that there are properly philosophical questions about the mind, philosophy not being a sort of junior partner in the collective enterprise of cognitive science. (shrink)

Starting from the discussion on the original set of criteria advanced by Clark and Chalmers (1998) meant to avoid the overextension of the mind, or the so-called “cognitive bloat”, we will sketch our solution to the problem of criteria evaluation, by connecting it to the search for a mark of the mental. Our proposal is to argue for a “weak conscientialist” mark of the mental based on transparent access, which vindicates the role of consciousness in defining what is mental without, (...) however, identifying the mental with the conscious. This renovated link between mind and consciousness, spelled out through the concept of transparency, further develops some of our previous work on the topic (Di Francesco 2007; Di Francesco and Piredda 2012) and is partially inspired by Horgan and Kriegel (2008). (shrink)

Recent developments in the neuroscience offer an increasing amount of “brain-based” explanations of decision-making in ethics . Are those explanations more basic than the psychological, “social” or philosophical ones? In my paper I address this question analyzing the meaning of “because” in sentences like “when someone is willing to act on a moral belief, it is because the emotional part of his or her brain has become active when considering the moral question at hand” . My answer is a pluralistic (...) one. I reject brain-fundamentalism and I argue that neuroscientific developments support a moderate form of naturalism, according to which empirical results may indirectly influence moral reflection, but offer no direct evidence to radical reductive naturalism. (shrink)